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WHEN ARE MERGER CLAUSES UNCONSCIONABLE?
By KERRY L. MACINTOSH*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: buyer, a typical consumer wishing
to obtain goods or services, visits seller. Anxious to close the deal, seller
impresses buyer with oral representations and promises concerning the
goods or services. Buyer, enticed into making the purchase, signs a
preprinted form contract, failing either to notice or understand this de-
ceptively harmless looking provision: "This writing is the final and en-
tire agreement of the parties and there are no other representations,
promises, warranties or agreements of any kind." Buyer later discovers
that the goods or services do not live up to seller's representations and
promises. Angry, buyer sues seller for breach of express warranty or
contract. Will buyer win?
The answer lies in the parol evidence rule, a substantive doctrine'
included in both the common law of contracts and Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code). 2 The parol evidence rule
gives legal effect to any intention the contracting parties may have to
make a writing the final and perhaps complete expression of their agree-
ment.3 A writing intended as a final expression of one or more terms of
an agreement is an integrated agreement.4 If adopted as a complete and
exclusive statement of the agreement, the writing is a completely inte-
grated agreement; 5 otherwise, it is a partially integrated agreement. 6
Under the parol evidence rule, evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreements or negotiations is not admissible to contradict a term of an
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1. The term "parol evidence rule" is a misnomer. The rule does not exclude certain
facts because they are undesirable or untrustworthy means of proof. Instead, it declares
that certain facts are legally ineffective, so that they may not be proven at all. Thus, the
parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law. 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2400, at 4 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-18 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202
(1978).
3. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.3, at 451 (1982).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(1) (1979).
5. Id. § 210(1).
6. Id. § 210(2).
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integrated agreement. 7 Further, evidence of consistent additional terms
is inadmissible to supplement a completely integrated agreement. 8
The parol evidence rule takes on special significance where the writ-
ing includes a merger or integration clause. Essentially, a merger clause
expressly provides that the writing constitutes the entire agreement be-
tween the parties, and that any prior or contemporaneous agreements,
representations, or warranties are excluded. 9 Since complete integra-
tion depends on the parties' intention, most courts view merger clauses
as conclusive evidence that the agreement is completely integrated.' 0
Armed with this knowledge, consider once again the opening hypo-
thetical scenario. As part of the offer, seller's oral representations and
promises would ordinarily become terms of the contract.I I If the sale is
of goods, so that Article Two of the U.C.C. applies,1 2 the oral represen-
tations and promises might even create express warranties' 3 which
could not be disclaimed.14 Nevertheless, because this harmless looking
7. Id. § 215. The Code's version of the parol evidence rule applies to "evidence of
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement." U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978).
The parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent agreements. An integration
may, therefore, be contradicted by evidence which shows its subsequent modification. 4 S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 631, at 950-51 (3d ed. 1961).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(1) (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1978).
9. Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the Parol Evidence Rule, 27 TEX. L. REV. 361
(1949).
10. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 458. But see, e.g., ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems,
Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Enrico Farms, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 629 F.2d
1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980) (dictum); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100
Idaho 175, 180, 595 P.2d 709, 714 (1979); Shoreham Developers, Inc. v. Randolph Hills,
Inc., 248 Md. 267, 272, 235 A.2d 735, 739 (1967).
The Second Restatement commentary states that a merger clause "if agreed to is
likely to conclude the issue whether the agreement is completely integrated." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 comment e (1979). However, "such a clause does not
control the question whether the writing was assented to as an integrated agreement, the
scope of the writing if completely integrated, or the interpretation of the written terms."
Id.
11. See I A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11, at 23 (1963).
12. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978).
13. When a seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise to a buyer which relates to
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain, an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise is created. Id. at § 2-313(l)(a). Applying this
test to the facts of the opening hypothetical, it appears that seller's representations and
promises concerning the goods may be promises or affirmations of fact relating to the
goods. Because these promises or affirmations of fact enticed buyer into making the
purchase, they are probably part of the basis of the bargain. Thus, express warranties that
the goods conform to seller's representations and promises might arise.
14. See Comment, Contracts - IVarranties, Unconscionability, and the Parol Evidence Rule -
Industralease Automated & Scientific Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 27 BUFFALO L.
REV. 521, 525 (1978). That an express warranty may not be disclaimed follows from
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1978), which provides:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reason-
able as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on
parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to
the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
Because an express warranty and a disclaimer of express warranty are necessarily in-
consistent with each other, § 2-316(1) does, in effect, prohibit the disclaimer by making it
inoperative. However, this prohibition is less complete than it might seem, because it is
subject to the parol evidence rule. If an express warranty were oral, and the written con-
[Vol. 64:3
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provision is a merger clause, the writing may very well be viewed by a
court as a completely integrated agreement. If so, buyer's evidence
proving the oral representations and promises as consistent additional
terms will be excluded,1 5 causing buyer to lose his lawsuit for breach of
express warranty or contract.16
This outcome is not inevitable. Several commentators have sug-
gested, without elaboration, that a merger clause may, under the proper
circumstances, be invalidated for unconscionability. 17 If the merger
clause were so invalidated, buyer would have the chance to establish that
the preprinted form contract was only a partially integrated agree-
ment,18 which could be supplemented by buyer's evidence of consistent
additional terms. 19
Modern unconscionability doctrine is embodied in section 2-302 of
the U.C.C., which provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
tract included a disclaimer of express warranty, then, assuming the written contract were
found to be the final expression of the agreement, the parol evidence rule would exclude
evidence of the contradictory oral express warranty. 2 W. HAWILAND, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE SERIES § 2-316:06, at 389 (1982); Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Con-
tracts - Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy?, 1968 DUKE L.J. 831, 852.
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. Depending on the facts he can prove and his jurisdiction, causes of action not
based on breach of contract or express warranty may still be available to buyer. For exam-
ple, the merger clause would not eliminate evidence of implied warranties. This is because
the parol evidence rule has no application to implied warranties, which arise by operation
of law rather than by conduct of the parties. Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty
Under the U. C.C. - How to Succeed in Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Trying, 46 DEN.
L.J. 579, 606 (1969). Moreover, the parol evidence rule does not generally preclude the
use of extrinsic evidence to show fraud. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 11, § 580, at 431; Annota-
tion, Application of Parol Evidence Rule of UCC § 2-202 Where Fraud or Misrepresentation Is
Claimed in Sale of Goods, 71 A.L.R. 3d 1059, 1060 (1976). Such evidence is ordinarily admis-
sible even in the face of a merger clause. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 11, § 578, at 405-07.
17. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-12, at 93 (2d ed. 1980); Axelrod, Application of U.C.C. 2-202 - The Inte-
grated Agreement, 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 1, 14 (1982); Hester, supra note 14, at 855.
Professors White and Summers have catalogued other strategies for defeating a
merger clause. For example, counsel could argue that the clause should be narrowly con-
strued, or could challenge the clause as the product of duress, bad faith, or mistake requir-
ing judicial reformation of the contract. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra, § 2-12, at 92-
95. An analysis of these alternative strategies is beyond the scope of this article.
18. According to the Second Restatement, any relevant evidence may be used to
prove that a writing is or is not a complete integration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 210 comment b (1979); see also id. § 214(b) (making even prior or contemporane-
ous agreements and negotiations admissible to establish whether agreement is completely
or partially integrated). This is because "a writing cannot of itself prove its own complete-
ness, and wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the
intention of the parties." Id. § 210 comment b. This approach is in sharp contrast with
the earlier view that if a writing appeared on its face to be a complete and exclusive state-
ment of the terms of the agreement, it was a complete integration. See, e.g., Gianni v. R.
Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 323, 126 A. 791, 792 (1924).
The U.C.C. does not designate any particular test for determining whether a writing is
a complete integration. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978). However, any assumption that an inte-
gration is a complete integration is rejected. Id. comment 1. Evidence of consistent addi-
tional terms must be excluded when the terms are such that, if agreed upon, would
certainly have been included in the writing. Id. comment 3.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(1) (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1978).
1988]
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clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the par-
ties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination. 20
Although section 2-302 is strictly applicable only to sales of goods fall-
ing within the purview of Article Two of the U.C.C., it has been applied
by analogy to cases not governed by Article Two, 2 1 and has been incor-
porated into the common law of contracts by the Second Restatement of
Contracts (Second Restatement). 2 2
It is the task of this article to explore more deeply the possibility
that a merger clause could be held unconscionable, thereby preserving
evidence of consistent additional express warranty or contract terms
which otherwise would be excluded under the parol evidence rule. This
article will first apply the fundamental principles of the modern uncon-
scionability doctrine to determine whether a merger clause may ever be
unconscionable, and, if so, under what circumstances. It will then ana-
lyze four cases discussing the unconscionability of merger clauses. 2 3 As
20. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979), which provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
The idea of refusing to enforce unconscionable contracts originated with neither the
U.C.C. nor the Second Restatement. Equity courts had long refused to grant specific en-
forcement of unconscionable contracts. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 528-33 (1967). Whether equity cases may be
used as a guide to the meaning of unconscionability in U.C.C. § 2-302 has been disputed.
Compare Leff, supra, at 533 (equity cases not helpful) with Hillman, Debunking Some Iyths
About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35-
41 (1981) (equity cases helpful).
23. Two cases which purport to address the unconscionability of a merger clause,
LeDonne v. Kessler, 256 Pa. Super. 280, 389 A.2d 1123 (1978), and Agristor Credit Corp.
v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Or. 1985), will not be fully analyzed in this article, for
the following reasons. First, it is doubtful whether a true merger clause was at issue in
LeDonne. There, paragraph six of the contract was referred to as an "integration clause."
Paragraph six provided: "The parties have full knowledge of the physical appearance of
the land and buildings and of the value thereof and there are no verbal representations as
to character or quality." LeDonne v. Kessler, 256 Pa. Super. 280, 285, 389 A.2d 1123,
1126 (1978). This term is too narrow to qualify as a recital of complete integration. Rather
than declaring all extrinsic representations, promises, and agreements to be without effect,
it disclaims only verbal representations regarding the character or quality of the real prop-
erty to be sold. Moreover, the LeDonne court limited the term's effect still further by inter-
preting it as a denial of representations regarding reasonably apparent, but not hidden,
conditions. Ledonne, 256 Pa. Super. at 291, 389 A.2d at 1129.
Second, as already noted, the focus of this article is on the use of the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine to invalidate the merger clause where it would otherwise exclude evidence of
consistent additional express warranty or contract terms under the parol evidence rule.
LeDonne and Agristor are not relevant to this focus. Neither case involves any attempt to
[Vol. 64:3
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a prelude, it is first necessary to give some background on the uncon-
scionability doctrine itself.
I. MODERN UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE
Certain aspects of modern unconscionability doctrine are well de-
fined. The decision as to whether a contract or clause is unconscionable
is one of law to be made by the court. 24 In making this decision, the
court must assess the contract or clause as of the time it was made.2 5
Also, in determining unconscionability, the court must judge the chal-
lenged contract or clause in light of its commercial setting, purpose and
effect. 2 6 Once it finds a contract or clause to be unconscionable, the
court has several options available to it. It may refuse to enforce the
contract, enforce the contract without the unconscionable clause, or
limit the application of any unconscionable clause so as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
2 7
The meaning of the term "unconscionable" is not defined in either
the Code or the Second Restatement. 28 The commentary to U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-302 provides only limited assistance:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be uncon-
scionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract.... The principle is one of the preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. 29
argue that, under the parol evidence rule, a merger clause excluded evidence of consistent
additional contract or express warranty terms. Rather, in each case, a merger clause, or at
least a term denominated as such, was asserted in an effort to defeat a cause of action for
fraud. In LeDonne, the court held that the parol evidence rule barred testimony of alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations concerning water leakage which contradicted the terms of
the supposed "integration clause." Ledonne, 256 Pa. Super. at 292, 389 A.2d at 1129-30.
In Agristor, the merger clause stated in part: "I rely on no other promises or conditions and
regard that as reasonable because these are acceptable to me." Agristor Credit Corp. v.
Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (D. Or. 1985). An Oregon statute provided that the
truth of facts recited in the written instrument could not be denied by the parties. In light
of this statute, the Agritor court held that the merger clause established a conclusive pre-
sumption that there was no reliance on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Id. (citing
OR. REV. STAT. § 42.300 (1981)).
24. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment
f (1979).
25. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
Thus, it has been held that an unexpected price increase subsequent to contracting which
makes performance of contract obligations onerous will not support a finding of uncon-
scionability. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1249
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); J.L. McEntire & Sons, Inc. v. Hart
Cotton Co., 256 Ark. 937, 511 S.W.2d 179 (1974).
26. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment
f (1979).
27. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
28. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
29. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1978) (citation omitted).
19881
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Legal scholars have done their best to bridge this definitional gap.3 0
In his influential article, Professor Leff suggests that there are two basic
types of unconscionability: procedural unconscionability, which has to
do with misbehavior during the contracting process, and substantive un-
conscionability, which has to do with evils in the resulting contract
itself.3
The Code commentary leads another author, Professor Spanogle,
to believe that procedural abuses are of two types: oppression, implying
compulsion resulting from a lack of opportunity to "codetermine"
terms, and unfair surprise, implying deception by artifice. 32 In his view,
oppression entails more than mere duress; oppression encompasses ad-
hesory form contracts, which allow one party to choose whether to con-
tract but not what the terms of the contract will be. 33 Unfair surprise
results from a variety of deceptive sales practices, including the use of
fine print to hide a clause, or the use of language incomprehensible to a
layperson. 34
Professor Spanogle further deduces that these procedural abuses
will render a term unconscionable only when coupled with substantive
abuses. 35 He proposes adopting a sliding scale approach, so that the
more procedural unconscionability is present, the less substantive un-
conscionability is required, and vice versa.3 6 Moreover, he argues, dif-
ferent substantive standards are applicable in situations involving
different procedural abuses in forming the contract.3 7 An oppressive,
nonbargained term is substantively suspect if it alters or impairs the fair
meaning of the bargained-for terms, or is "manifestly unreasonable. ' '38
The concept of manifest unreasonableness is based upon a weighing of
any legitimate commercial interest served by the nonbargained term
against any identifiable public policies offended by the term. 39 These
30. See e.g., Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PiTrr. L. REV. 337
(1970); Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV.
121 (1967); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Epstein,
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293 (1975); Hillman, supra note 22;
Leff, supra note 22; Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1 (1969);
Schwartz, A Reexamination ofiVonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977);
Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Speidel, Un-
conscionability, Assent & Consumer Protection, 31 U. PtTrr. L. REV. 359 (1970).
31. Leff, supra note 22, at 487.
32. Spanogle, supra note 30, at 943.
33. Id. at 944.
34. Id. at 943.
35. Id. Professor Spanogle reasons that the commentary's indication that unfair sur-
prise is to be prevented suggests "not only that there must be abuses in forming the con-
tract, but also that such abuses have allowed the drafting party to take unfair advantage of
the non-drafting party." Id. Similarly, impermissible oppression can be distinguished
from permissible allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power by looking be-
yond the procedural abuse of nonbargaining to the difference between reasonable and
unreasonable resultant contract terms. Id. at 944.
36. Id. at 952.
37. Id. at 947.
38. Id. at 945.
39. Id. at 958. Terms offensive to public policy include not only those terms actually
prohibited, but also those disfavored by public policy. Id. at 960. Note that under the
[Vol. 64:3
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two standards are objective, for they depend on the court's view of the
term's fairness. 4 0 On the other hand, where the procedural abuse is un-
fair surprise, a term is subject to substantive abuse if it violates the sur-
prised party's reasonable expectations. 4 1 Such a violation might occur if
the party who drafted the contract deliberately creates expectations in
the surprised party which are contrary to the terms of the contract.4 2
This shift in emphasis from the court's view of the term's fairness to the
surprised party's reaction to the term is justified by the need to afford
additional protection where unfair surprise is involved.4 3
Having determined that no procedural abuse is sufficient to render
a term unconscionable absent a substantive abuse, Professor Spanogle
also discusses the converse question: Could a substantive abuse alone
render a term unconscionable? He concedes that the word "oppres-
sion" could refer to terms having an oppressive effect, so that proce-
dural abuses would be irrelevant. 4 4  Since a review of pre-Code
unconscionability cases indicates that an especially harsh term could by
itself constitute unconscionability, Professor Spanogle concludes that a
limited use of a purely substantive definition of oppression is
justifiable. 4 5
sliding scale approach, when a disfavored term is involved, a sufficiently egregious proce-
dural abuse may justify voiding the term. Id.
40. Id. at 946.
41. Id. at 947-48. Professor Spanogle's theory that an unfairly surprising term is sub-
stantively suspect if it violates the reasonable expectations of the surprised party does not
appear to be based upon, and thus must be distinguished from, that principle of insurance
law which holds that a term of an insurance policy which is inconsistent with the reason-
able expectations of the insured will not be enforced. See R. KEETON, BASic TEXT ON IN-
SURANCE LAw 351 (1971). The drafters of the Second Restatement believed that this
"expectations principle" was valid with respect to all standardized agreements. Birnbaum,
Stahl & West, Standardized Agreements and the Parol Evidence Rule: Defining and Applying the
Expectations Principle, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 811 (1984). Accordingly, they adopted the fol-
lowing provision:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings
are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts
the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the
writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the
standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the
term is not part of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979). The commentary explains that
"[although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by
them without even appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation." Id. comment f.
The expectations principle is closely related to the unconscionability doctrine. See id.
An examination of this relationship is, however, beyond the scope of this article. For a
lucid analysis of the expectations principle in the Second Restatement, see Murray, The
Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1342 (1975).
42. Spanogle, supra note 30, at 963.
43. Id. at 947.
44. Id. at 948.
45. Id. at 950. As Professor Spanogle points out, one consequence of this theory is
1988]
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A review of the cases shows them to be consistent with much of
Professor Spanogle's analysis. Many of the factors identified by the
courts as supporting a finding of unconscionability fit within the two cat-
egories of procedural abuse, oppression and unfair surprise. Inequality
of bargaining power 4 6 and the use of a form contract containing non-
negotiable terms4 7 may indicate oppression resulting from an inability
to codetermine the contract terms. 4 8 On the other hand, lack of educa-
tion or business sophistication, 4 9 inability to read English, 50 use of con-
tract language incomprehensible to a layperson, 5 1 and burying of
provisions in fine print or on the reverse side of the contract 5 2 are all
factors suggesting that a challenged term is unfairly surprising to one
party, because it is hidden from or incomprehensible to him.
53
Case law defines substantive abuse broadly, asking whether the
challenged term is overly harsh 54 or unreasonably favorable. 55 These
that grossly excessive price, a form of substantive abuse, might render a contract uncon-
scionable, even in the absence of any procedural abuse. Id. at 952.
46. See, e.g., Martin vJoseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 301 (6th Cir. 1985); Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Funiture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); A & M Produce Co. v.
FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 488, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (1982); Fischer v. General
Elec. Hotpoint, 108 Misc. 2d 683, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1981).
The doctrine of unconscionability is not intended to disturb allocation of risk due to
superior bargaining power. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment I (1978); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment d (1979). Thus, superior bargaining power alone may be
insufficient to sustain a finding of unconscionability. See Seekings v.Jimmy GMC, Inc., 130
Ariz. 596, 602, 638 P.2d 210, 216 (1981).
47. See, e.g., Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 111 (S.D. Miss. 1979); A &
M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 125 (1982).
Some courts have declined to hold a nonnegotiable term unconscionable, where the com-
plaining party was under no economic pressure and could have walked away from the deal.
See Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 778-79 (N.D. Ga.
1983); RJM Sales & Mktg. v. Banfi Prod. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (D. Minn. 1982).
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 111 (S.D. Miss. 1979). Conversely, educa-
tion or business sophistication may weigh against a finding of unconscionability. See, e.g.,
Fotomat Corp. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); K & C, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 308-09, 263 A.2d 390, 393 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 951, 371 N.Y.S.2d
289, 291 (1975);Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 141, 302 N.Y.S.2d
390, 393 (1969).
51. See Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 759, 549 P.2d 903, 907
(1976); see also Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 575 (8th Cir.
1975) (whether complaining party understood challenged term is a relevant considera-
tion); Fischer v. General Elec. Hotpoint, 108 Misc. 2d 683, 684, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691
(1981) (same).
52. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
124 (1982); Capital Assoc. v. Hudgens, 455 So. 2d 651, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); C &
J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 179 (Iowa 1975); Bogatz v.
Case Catering Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 1052, 1056, 383 N.Y.S.2d 535, 538 (1976).
53. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
54. See Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 951 (Ind. App. 1982); Funding Sys.
Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634 (Mo. App. 1979); Schroeder
v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 260, 544 P.2d 20, 23 (1975).
55. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp 774, 778 (N.D. Ga.
1983); RJM Sales & Mktg. v. Banfi Prod. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (D. Minn. 1982).
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definitions are sufficiently general to encompass the more specific sub-
stantive standards proposed by Professor Spanogle: impairment of bar-
gained-for terms, manifest unreasonableness, and violation of
reasonable expectations.
As Professor Spanogle suggests, both procedural and substantive
abuses are generally required to render a term unconscionable. 5 6 His
sliding scale approach to the determination of unconscionability has also
been well received. 57 Finally, Professor Spanogle's conclusion that a se-
vere substantive abuse alone can render a term unconscionable is rein-
forced by the commentary to the Second Restatement. The Second
Restatement states that some types of terms are not enforced, regardless
of context, and illustrates this principle with examples of unreasonably
large liquidated damages provisions and limitations on a debtor's right
to redeem collateral. 58
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO THE MERGER CLAUSE
Can a merger clause be unconscionable? In an effort to answer this
question, the foregoing principles will be applied to the hypothetical
scenario set forth at the beginning of this article.
A merger clause, like any other clause, may be subject to the proce-
dural abuses of oppression and unfair surprise. In the hypothetical sce-
nario, buyer signs a preprinted form contract prepared by seller. Very
probably the contract's terms are nonnegotiable. Thus the procedural
abuse of oppression is almost certainly present. 59 Since buyer is a typi-
cal consumer, he may well lack business sophistication, or possibly even
a decent education. If he does not notice the merger clause, it may be
buried in fine print or located in a place that is easy to miss. If he does
not understand the meaning of the clause, perhaps it is written in lan-
guage incomprehensible to a layperson. 60 Accordingly, the procedural
56. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
122 (1982); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634
(Mo. App. 1979); see, e.g., Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 575-
76 (8th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 778 (N.D. Ga.
1983); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Bank of
Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109 (S.D. Miss. 1979).
57. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 487, 186 Cal. Rptr.
114, 122 (1982); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624,
634 (Mo. App. 1979).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment e (1979). In theory, the
substantive abuse of grossly excessive price might be sufficient to render a contract uncon-
scionable. See supra note 45. Some cases have held contracts unconscionable on the basis
of grossly excessive price. However, they arguably involved procedural abuses as well. See
Spanogle, supra note 30, at 964-67.
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. Indeed, it would be a rare merger clause which would be comprehensible to a
layperson in any meaningful sense, given that laypeople are not generally aware of the
effect such a clause will have under the parol evidence rule. The following language has
been suggested in substitution of the traditional merger clause: "Write anything anyone
said about this sale which was important to you in the space that follows. Understand this:
If you haven't got it in writing, you haven't got it." A. CORBIN, supra note 1I, § 578, at 645
(Supp. 1984) (emphasis in original). This language is so clear that it seems unlikely a
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abuse of unfair surprise is probably present also.6 1
The next step is to review the transaction for substantive abuse.
Since the procedural abuse of oppression is probably involved, the
merger clause will be unconscionable if it is manifestly unreasonable or
if it alters or impairs the fair meaning of the bargained-for terms. 62 An
argument that the clause is manifestly unreasonable would be difficult to
construct. Manifest unreasonableness is determined by weighing any
public policies offended by a term against legitimate commercial needs
or purposes served by that term.6 3 There appear to be no identifiable
public policies offended by merger clauses in general. On the contrary,
the very existence of the parol evidence rule, a substantive doctrine
designed to enforce the parties' intent to make a writing the complete
and final expression of their agreement, 64 evidences the legitimacy of
merger clauses, which are no more than declarations of such intent.
Moreover, merger clauses serve many legitimate commercial purposes.
For example, parties to a contract may have engaged in lengthy negotia-
tions, with several proposals made and rejected. The parties may insert
a merger clause to protect the integrity of the final agreement against
attempts to resurrect a superseded proposal. 65 Also, a principal may
find inclusion of a merger clause to be helpful in protecting himself
against the overenthusiastic, unauthorized representations of his
agent. 66 Finally, merger clauses serve the legitimate purpose of guard-
ing against false allegations of consistent additional terms. 67 Thus, even
if this merger clause were offensive to public policy, its tendency to fur-
ther a legitimate commercial purpose could render it manifestly
reasonable.
That this merger clause alters or impairs the fair meaning of the
bargained-for terms seems a more likely conclusion. Seller makes oral
representations and promises in an attempt to induce a sale of goods or
services and increase his profits. He succeeds. Buyer, enticed by those
representations and promises, decides to make the purchase. Seller's
representations and promises will ordinarily become express warranties
or contract terms. However, the preprinted form contract includes a
merger clause. As a recital of complete integration, the merger clause
has the effect under the parol evidence rule of excluding evidence of
these consistent additional terms.6 8 By so doing, the clause impairs
these bargained-for terms.
seller would be willing to use it for fear of awakening the buyer to the fact that the sales
pitch meant nothing.
61. See supra notes 49, 51, and 52 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
65. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 2-12, at 90.
66. Id. at 91.
67. See id. § 12-4, at 437; see also U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 2 (1978) (parol evidence
rule provides protection against false allegations of oral warranties). Of course, since the
parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent agreements, the protection against per-
jury afforded by the merger clause is less than total. See supra note 7.
68. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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Professor Spanogle analogizes this prohibition of the alteration or
impairment of bargained-for terms to U.C.C. section 2-316(1),69 which
prohibits the disclaimer of express warranties. 70 To the extent this
merger clause prevents buyer from proving oral express warranties
made by seller, it has the same effect as a disclaimer of express
warranties.
Because the procedural abuse of unfair surprise is probably also in-
volved in this transaction, the merger clause will be unconscionable if it
violates buyer's reasonable expectations under the contract. 7 1 Seller,
through his representations and promises, deliberately creates an expec-
tation in buyer that he enjoys the benefit of additional contract or ex-
press warranty terms. By excluding evidence of these consistent
additional terms, the merger clause contradicts this expectation. 72
Since the merger clause is contrary to an expectation seller deliberately
created in buyer, buyer's reasonable expectations are frustrated by the
clause. 7 3
Thus, application of the unconscionability doctrine to the hypothet-
ical scenario demonstrates that a merger clause may indeed be uncon-
scionable. In fact, the hypothetical scenario is a perfect vehicle to
illustrate the merger clause's potential for unconscionability, since it in-
volves both procedural and substantive abuses, as are generally required
to render a term unconscionable. 74 Yet, it has been suggested that par-
ticularly harsh terms may be unconscionable even in the absence of pro-
cedural abuses. 75 Some terms are so offensive to public policy or a
sense of decency that they will be considered unconscionable and unen-
forceable, even though the parties willingly and knowingly assented to
their inclusion in the contract. Could a merger clause which is freely
bargained for and understood by both parties ever be so offensive to
public policy as to be unconscionable? The answer appears to be no.
Although a merger clause may exclude evidence of consistent additional
terms which would have conferred valuable legal rights upon one of the
parties, whatever harshness may result is impliedly sanctioned by the
law, which, in the form of the parol evidence rule, enforces the merger
clause's declaration of complete integration. 7 6 Accordingly, the follow-
69. See Spanogle, supra note 30, at 946.
70. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
72. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
73. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 45 and 58 and accompanying text.
76. See text accompanying note 64 supra. Of course, the decision that the merger
clause itself is not unconscionable in the absence of procedural abuses does not preclude a
determination that other forms of purely substantive unconscionability are present. For
example, the possibility that grossly excessive price is an independent basis for finding
unconscionability, even in the absence of any procedural abuse, has been noted. See supra
notes 45 and 58. Where a merger clause is applied to eliminate terms conferring valuable
legal rights, the price charged for the remaining rights may turn out to be grossly exces-
sive, and, therefore, unconscionable. Cf 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2-302:04, at
171 (excessive price is the true basis for a determination that a disclaimer is
unconscionable).
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ing analysis of the cases addressing the unconscionability of a merger
clause will proceed on the assumption that both procedural and substan-
tive abuses must be shown before a merger clause may be held
unconscionable.
III. ANALYSIS OF CASES ADDRESSING THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF A
MERGER CLAUSE
Four cases address the unconscionability of a merger clause as-
serted under the parol evidence rule as an impediment to proof of con-
sistent additional contract or express warranty terms. 7 7
A. Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc.
Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc. 78 provides the most detailed analysis in
support of a holding that a merger clause is unconscionable. There,
plaintiffs purchased a water pump for their farm from defendant. When
the pump failed to function, plaintiffs sued for breach of various express
oral warranties allegedly made by defendant in agreeing to install the
pump. Defendant argued that the written contract, which contained a
merger clause, was intended to be the complete and exclusive expres-
sion of the parties' agreement, which could not be supplemented by the
express oral warranties under the parol evidence rule. 79
The Oregon Court of Appeals disagreed, attacking the merger
clause on two grounds. First, the court noted, supplemental terms were
barred by the parol evidence rule only if both parties intended the writ-
ing as a complete expression of their agreement. Since the merger
clause was inconspicuous, it provided "little or no evidence of the par-
ties' intentions, regardless of the defendant's intentions.''80 Second, the
court observed, under U.C.C. section 2-302, courts were to limit the ap-
plication of contract provisions so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Citing the comments to section 2-302, the court stated that one princi-
77. The cases are: Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146 (5th
Cir. 1979); Smith v. Central Soya, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.C. 1985); Seibel v. Layne
& Bowler, Inc., 56 Or. App. 387, 641 P.2d 668 (1982); Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co.,
20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978), petition for review denied, 91 Wash. 2d 1004
(1978).
78. 56 Or. App. 387, 641 P.2d 668 (1982).
79. Id. at 391, 641 P.2d at 671.
80. Id. The Seibel court offered no explanation as to why the merger clause's incon-
spicuousness should render it a poor indicator of the parties' intentions. A suggestion
follows. Under the objective theory of contracts, a party is bound by the impression he
reasonably creates. This principle has given rise to the "duty to read" rule, providing that
a party who signs an instrument manifests assent, even if he did not read or understand it.
Calamari, Duty to Read - A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974). Nevertheless,
under traditional exceptions to the duty to read rule, a party is not bound by provisions
which are written illegibly, hidden in fine print, or placed in such a way that they are not
likely to come to his attention. Id. at 343. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Seibel, despite hav-
ing entered into the written contract, arguably did not manifest their objective assent to
the merger clause, which was buried in fine print, and were not bound by its recital of
complete integration.
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pie underlying unconscionability was the prevention of unfair surprise.
It concluded:
We think that it would be unconscionable to permit an incon-
spicuous merger clause to exclude evidence of an express oral
warranty-especially in light of the policy expressed by ORS
72.3160. That is, a disclaimer of the implied warranties of fit-
ness and merchantability must be conspicuous to prevent sur-
prise. We think that a merger clause which would deny effect
to an express warranty must be conspicuous to prevent an even
greater surprise.81
The Seibel court provided no independent explanation of why the
merger clause was inconspicuous. However, it did state that the merger
clause was as inconspicuous as the written contract's disclaimer of all
express and implied warranties. 8 2 Presumably the merger clause suf-
fered from the same inadequacies as the disclaimer, which was hidden in
text which was printed in small type, in long and closely spaced lines,
and without indentation or extra spacing between paragraphs. 83
Having struck down the merger clause, the court was quick to add a
placatory footnote:
We recognize that a merger clause is appropriate where a seller
wishes to protect himself from his over-enthusiastic salesman's
unauthorized oral representations (and from a fabricated oral
representation). But unless the buyer is informed that the
seller is disavowing those representations, the seller cannot ex-
pect protection from his agent's errors.8 4
The Seibel court's decision that the merger clause was unconsciona-
ble was founded squarely on the clause's inconspicuousness. Inconspic-
uousness, as the court itself suggested, is an indicator of the procedural
abuse of unfair surprise. 8 5 But, the unconscionability doctrine gener-
ally requires the presence of both substantive and procedural uncon-
scionability before a clause may be struck down. 86 There was no direct
discussion in the Seibel opinion of the merger clause's substantive uncon-
scionability. The court did see fit, however, to state that a merger clause
was an appropriate protection against unauthorized or fabricated repre-
sentations. This statement supports the view that a merger clause is not
subject to the substantive abuse of manifest unreasonableness where it
serves these legitimate commercial purposes. 87
To complete the analysis which the Seibel court left unfinished, it is
necessary to apply the substantive standard corresponding to the proce-
81. Sebel, 56 Or. App. at 391-92, 641 P.2d at 671.
82. Id. at 391, 641 P.2d at 671. In an earlier section of its opinion, the Seibel court
invalidated this disclaimer for failure to conform to U.C.C. § 2-316(2), requiring that a
disclaimer of implied warranties be conspicuous. Seibel, 56 Or. App. at 391, 641 P.2d at
670.
83. Seibel, 56 Or. App. at 391, 641 P.2d at 670.
84. Id. at 392 n.1, 641 P.2d at 671 n.l.
85. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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dural abuse of unfair surprise, that is, whether the challenged term
defeats the surprised party's reasonable expectations.8 8 Here, the
merger clause would have excluded evidence of express oral warranties
made by defendant to plaintiffs. An express warranty is, by definition, a
guarantee that the goods will conform to an affirmation of fact or prom-
ise concerning the goods, any description of the goods, or any sample or
model which becomes or is made part of the basis of the bargain. 89 In
other words, an express warranty seeks to enforce expectations concern-
ing the goods which seller deliberately induced in buyer. The merger
clause in Seibel would have effectively eliminated defendant's express
warranties, thereby foiling plaintiffs' reasonable expectations. There-
fore, it appears that the Seibel court's conclusion, that the merger clause
was unconscionable, was justified on both procedural and substantive
grounds.
B. Smith v. Central Soya, Inc.
In Smith v. Central Soya, Inc. ,90 a federal district court applying North
Carolina law refused to find a merger clause unconscionable. Smith in-
volved a series of written egg production contracts. Under these con-
tracts, plaintiffs were obligated to furnish such housing, equipment,
utilities, litter, and labor as was necessary for the proper care and hous-
ing of chickens and the eggs they produced. Defendant, Central Soya of
Athens, Inc. (Central Soya), promised to supply chickens and pay plain-
tiffs a monthly sum for their services. Central Soya repeatedly renewed
these contracts by supplying plaintiffs with replacement flocks of chick-
ens annually. Ten years after entering into the first egg production con-
tract, Central Soya sold its business to the codefendant, Sun City
Industries, Inc. (Sun City), which assumed Central Soya's contractual
obligations. Sun City completed performance under the contracts for
the current egg production period, but did not supply further replace-
ment chickens at the end of the laying cycle. 9 1
Plaintiffs sued, alleging that prior to execution of the written con-
tracts, agents of Central Soya had orally represented that Central Soya
would continue to supply replacement chickens so that plaintiffs would
have an income for twenty years on their chicken houses. Thus, they
contended, Sun City's decision not to supply replacement chickens was a
breach of contract. 92
The primary obstacle to plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of con-
tract was the merger clause in each of the egg production contracts.
Pointing out that evidence of prior and contemporaneous negotiations
and agreements could not be used to vary, add to, or contradict a total
88. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
89. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1978).
90. 604 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
91. Id. at 521-22.
92. Id. at 522-23.
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integration, 93 the Smith court stated that a merger clause created a pre-
sumption of total integration, which could be rebutted only by evidence
establishing fraud, bad faith, negligent omission, mistake in fact, or un-
conscionability. 94 Responding to plaintiffs' argument that the merger
clause was unconscionable, the court set forth a two-part test, requiring
plaintiffs to "demonstrate that (1) they had no meaningful choice but to
deal with the defendants and accept the contract as offered and (2) the
merger clause was unreasonably favorable to the defendants. ' 95
The court found that neither element of this test was satisfied.
First, although the egg production contracts were preprinted standard-
ized contracts prepared by Central Soya, so that the merger clause was
nonnegotiable, plaintiffs had a choice because they were not under eco-
nomic duress and did not have to enter into the contracts. Nor did Cen-
tral Soya occupy a grossly superior bargaining position. Second, the
merger clause was not unreasonably advantageous to defendants. The
clause simply granted preclusive effect to the written terms of the con-
tracts and, under other circumstances, could as easily have benefited
plaintiffs as defendants. Finally, the court observed, the evidence indi-
cated that the plaintiffs signed the contracts with a complete under-
standing of their terms and with knowledge they were to last for one
year, not twenty. Therefore, the court held the merger clause was not
unconscionable, the contracts were total integrations, and plaintiffs' pa-
rol evidence should be excluded. 9 6 Summary judgment for defendants
on the breach of contract claim was granted. 9 7
In analyzing the Smith case in light of the adopted conceptual frame-
work, it is first necessary to ask whether either of the two types of proce-
dural abuse, unfair surprise or oppression, was present. It seems
unlikely that plaintiffs were unfairly surprised; the court emphasized that
they had read and completely understood the contract terms, which pre-
sumably included the merger clause. However, the egg production con-
tracts were preprinted standardized contracts prepared by Central Soya,
making the merger clause nonnegotiable. This refusal to bargain consti-
tuted oppression.9 8
By contrast, the Smith court made evident its belief that a more se-
vere degree of oppression, that is, one party's refusal to bargain coupled
with the other party's inability to choose whether to contract at all, was
required before the merger clause could be held unconscionable. Such
a narrow view of oppression, though supported by some case law, 99
seems undesireable. It restricts the utility of the unconscionability doc-
trine as a means of strengthening freedom of contract, which implies not
only the ability to choose whether to enter into a contract, but also the
93. Id. at 524 (citing Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 185, 287 S.E.2d. 840, 845 (1982)).
94. Id. at 526.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 527.
97. Id. at 528.
98. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 47.
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mutual ability to determine the terms of the contract."0 0
Assuming that the procedural abuse of oppression was present, the
merger clause must next be examined to determine whether it was mani-
festly unreasonable, or altered or impaired the fair meaning of the bar-
gained-for terms. 10 1 There seems little likelihood that the clause was
manifestly unreasonable. As already indicated, a merger clause does not
offend public policy; 10 2 and sufficient commercial justification for inclu-
sion of the merger clause in Central Soya's standardized contracts could
have been found in Central Soya's need to protect itself against the un-
authorized representations of its agents.' 0 3 Moreover, in this particular
case, it seems doubtful that the merger clause altered or impaired the
fair meaning of the bargained-for terms. As an alternative basis for its
grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, the Smith
court held that the oral representations regarding the continuation of
the business relationship for twenty years were at best mere expressions
of belief or opinion which created absolutely no contractual obliga-
tion. 10 4 Thus, the merger clause in Smith did not impair any bargained-
for term, because the evidence excluded by the clause was itself legally
insufficient to establish any such term. It follows that there was no sub-
stantive abuse justifying a holding that the merger clause was
unconscionable. 10 5
The Smith court appears to have reached the correct conclusion, but
for the wrong reasons. In examining whether the merger clause was
unreasonably favorable to the defendants, the court was applying a test
of substantive unconscionability. It concluded that the merger clause
was not unreasonably favorable to the defendants because, under other
circumstances, the merger clause might have benefited plaintiffs as eas-
ily as defendants. This analysis is unsupportable for two reasons. First,
unconscionability doctrine requires a challenged term to be judged in
light of the particular facts of the case, not some hypothetical facts. 106
Second, the court's analysis implies that a term which applies equally to
both parties cannot be substantively unconscionable. If this standard
were adopted, no merger clause or any other even-handed clause' 0 7
could ever be substantively unconscionable. Yet the tendency of the
100. Spanogle, supra note 30, at 935-36.
101. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
102. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
103. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. That Central Soya did its business
through agents can be inferred from plaintiffs' allegation that agents of Central Soya orally
represented to them that replacement chickens would be supplied for twenty years. Smith
v. Central Soya, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518, 522 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
104. Smith, 604 F. Supp. at 527. Smith claimed that Central Soya stated, "[w]e're in the
chicken business to stay," and that "the chicken houses will last for twenty years." Id.
105. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
106. Spanogle, supra note 30, at 937.
107. In Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 779 (N.D. Ga.
1983), a case cited by the Smith court, an unconscionability challenge to a termination
clause in a distributorship contract was rejected, at least in part on the rationale that the
clause gave either party to the contract the unilateral power to terminate the contract upon
30 days notice.
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merger clause to foster such substantive abuses as impairing bargained-
for terms or defeating reasonable expectations has already been
demonstrated.10 8
C. Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co.
In Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co. ,109 the buyer of a defective porta-
ble sawmill sued the seller for breach of express and implied warranties.
In support of an argument that no such warranties had been made, the
seller offered into evidence a purchase order which included a merger
clause and a disclaimer of all express and implied warranties.' 10 The
trial court excluded the purchase order, and the jury subsequently ren-
dered a verdict for the buyer. The Washington state Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court's ruling that the merger clause was both un-
reasonable and unconscionable. I"' However, the court did not analyze
the clause in traditional unconscionability terms. Instead, it noted that,
in one sentence of the purchase order, the subject matter of the sale was
referred to as a "motor vehicle."' 12 In view of this "outright inaccu-
racy," the court reasoned, the purchase order was not an integrated con-
tract, and its admission into evidence without excision of the merger
clause would, therefore, have constituted prejudicial error.' 13
This reasoning is opaque. To begin with, there seems to be no rea-
son why the parties could not have intended the purchase order as a
complete integration, despite the fact that it was apparently a form con-
tract ordinarily used in motor vehicle sales. 114 Further, the Butcher court
utterly failed to explain why its conclusion that the purchase order was
not a complete integration, despite the merger clause, justified its adop-
tion of the trial court's ruling that the merger clause was
unconscionable.
Constructing a more appropriate analysis is not an easy task. The
Butcher opinion did not discuss any facts which would allow a determina-
tion of whether the merger clause was affected by the procedural abuse
of unfair surprise. That the purchase order inappropriately referred to
the subject matter of the sale as a motor vehicle suggests that it was a
form contract. If, in addition, the merger clause was nonnegotiable,
then the clause was subject to the procedural abuse of oppression. t5
108. See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
109. 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978), petition for review denied, 91 Wash. 2d
1004 (1978).
110. Id. at 365-66, 581 P.2d at 1356-57.
111. Id. at 367, 581 P.2d at 1357.
112. The offending sentence provided: "I hereby certify that no credit has been ex-
tended to me for the purchase of this motor vehicle except as appears in writing on the face
of this agreement." Id. at 368, 581 P.2d at 1357 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 368, 581 P.2d at 1358.
114. It seems unlikely that the use of the words "motor vehicle" would have caused any
true confusion. Elsewhere in the purchase order, the subject matter of the sale was identi-
fied as "one Garrett Ecologizer," the brand name of the portable sawmill. Id. at 367, 581
P.2d at 1357.
115. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Since the seller asserted the merger clause for the purpose of defeating
express warranty claims, it might be concluded that the clause impaired
these bargained-for express warranties, a form of substantive abuse.1 16
Thus, the Butcher court's holding that the merger clause was unconscion-
able was arguably justified.
D. Franz Chemical Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co.
The decision of the unconscionability issue in Franz Chemical Corp. v.
Philadelphia Quartz Co. 117 was still more cryptic. There, plaintiff sued de-
fendant for damages resulting when a protective ship hull coating which
had been purchased from defendant and resold to a third party cracked
and failed to adhere properly. The lower court granted summary judg-
ment for defendant, relying on a sales order acknowledgment form and
warranty which limited plaintiff's remedy for breach to replacement of
the goods. The lower court also held that a patent licensing agreement,
whereby defendant licensed plaintiff to sell its protective coating, was
merely an agreement by defendant not to sue plaintiff for infringement
of intellectual property rights, and was not part of the contract for sale
so as to nullify the limitation of remedy. 1 18
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the lower court erred in finding that
there was a bare licensing agreement as a matter of law, since evidence
of additional terms raised factual issues as to what the parties intended
to include in the license agreement. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected this contention and affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
The license agreement, it noted, included a merger clause, indicating
intent to completely integrate the agreement. Therefore, the parol evi-
dence rule precluded consideration of any evidence of consistent addi-
tional terms.1 19 In passing, the Franz court summarily rejected the
possibility that the merger clause was unconscionable, stating: "we can
find no indication that the merger clause should be deemed unconscion-
able under U.C.C. 2-302."120
The Franz opinion did not provide sufficient facts to allow analysis
under the conceptual framework adopted in this article. The court did
not indicate whether indicia of oppression, such as inequality of bargain-
ing power 12 1 or the use of a form contract containing nonnegotiable
terms, 122 were present. Nor did the court mention any facts which
would allow a determination of whether the merger clause was unfairly
surprising. 12 3 Given that both procedural and substantive abuses must
116. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
117. 594 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1979).
118. Id. at 148.
119. Id. at 149.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
123. In another section of its opinion dealing with the unconscionability of the remedy
limitation, the Franz court noted that the president of the plaintiff corporation was an ex-
perienced businessman. Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146, 149
(5th Cir. 1979). Lack of education or business experience is a factor which might make it
[Vol. 64:3
HeinOnline  -- 64 Denv. U. L. Rev. 546 1987-1988
MERGER CLAUSES
be present to justify a holding of unconscionability, 124 the inability to
resolve these procedural issues dooms any attempt to resolve the
broader unconscionability issue.
CONCLUSION
As a theoretical matter, the commentators' suggestion that a merger
clause may be unconscionable is well founded. Both procedural and
substantive abuses must generally be present before a term may be held
unconscionable. A merger clause, like any other term, may be obtained
through a flawed bargaining process, so that it is subject to the proce-
dural abuses of oppression or unfair surprise. Moreover, even though a
merger clause does not violate public policy and is unlikely to lack com-
mercial justification, it may be subject to other substantive abuses. The
effect of the merger clause under the parol evidence rule is to exclude
evidence of consistent additional terms. Therefore, a nonbargained
merger clause may impair bargained-for terms of the agreement. Like-
wise, an unfairly surprising merger clause may violate the surprised
party's reasonable expectations.
As a practical matter, the very existence of the four merger clause
cases discussed in this article indicates that some lawyers and judges
have accepted the suggestion that a merger clause may be unconsciona-
ble. That there are only four such cases indicates at the same time that
the concept has not yet gained wide currency in the legal community.
As application of the adopted conceptual framework to the opening hy-
pothetical demonstrated, a merger clause in a standardized form con-
tract is vulnerable to an unconscionability challenge. Given the
frequency with which merger clauses appear in form contracts, counsel
for non-drafting contracting parties are presented with abundant oppor-
tunities for bringing successful unconscionability challenges. It seems
odd that these opportunities have not been more vigorously pursued.
Moreover, the courts which have considered the unconscionability
of a merger clause have generally failed to render a complete analysis of
the issue. For example, the Seibel court ignored the general requirment
that both procedural and substantive abuses must be present when it
held a merger clause unconscionable on procedural grounds alone.
Worse yet, the Butcher and Franz courts decided the unconscionability
issue in a conclusory fashion, without discussing either procedural or
substantive abuses. Unconscionability doctrine is powerful stuff; it
should not be used, as in the Butcher case, to strike down a merger clause
without a full explanation of its applicability. Nor is it appropriate to
reject an unconscionability challenge summarily, as the Franz court did.
In so doing, these courts left future lawyers and their clients mystified as
to the circumstances under which a merger clause will be held invalid.
more likely that a party was unfairly surprised by a particular term. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text. However, business experience, in and of itself, is insufficient to prove
the absence of unfair surprise.
124. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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There is a possible explanation for both the paucity of cases involv-
ing unconscionability challenges to merger clauses, and the courts' ten-
dency towards incomplete legal analysis of those challenges brought.
Despite occasional scholarly suggestions that a merger clause could be
attacked for unconscionability, a fuller, more carefully reasoned analysis
of the clause's potential for unconscionability was lacking, until now. It
is hoped this article, by explaining the circumstances under which a
merger clause may be unconscionable, will encourage practitioners to
bring more unconscionability challenges to merger clauses and guide
courts in deciding those challenges.
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